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Abstract: What controls should be used to ensure adequate security level during operation is a non-trivial subject in 
complex software systems and applications. The problem becomes even more challenging when the 
application uses multiple cloud services which security measures are beyond the control of the application 
provider. In this paper, a methodology that enables the identification of the best security controls for multi-
cloud applications which components are deployed in heterogeneous cloud providers is presented. The 
methodology is based on application decomposition and modelling of threats over the components, followed 
by the analysis of the risks together with the capture of cloud business and security requirements. The 
methodology has been applied in the MUSA EU H2020 project use cases as the first step for building up the 
multi-cloud applications’ security-aware Service Level Agreements (SLA). The identified security controls 
will be included in the applications’ SLAs for their monitoring and fulfilment assurance at operation. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Multi-cloud approaches that promote the 
simultaneous usage of multiple cloud services are 
emerging as a solution to optimise availability, 
performance and cost of the applications (Ferry et al., 
2013). 
With respect to whether multi-cloud paradigm 
brings benefits to the application security, there are 
currently two main opinion streams within the 
research community: one that advocates multi-cloud 
as being strong security enabler (thanks to the strong 
security measures offered by professional cloud 
service providers and possibility to replace cloud 
services when needed), and one that, on the contrary, 
considers multi-cloud as risk enhancer (mainly due 
to the lack of insight and control over the consumed 
clouds, as well as the challenges posed by 
orchestration). 
Different approaches for multi-cloud have been 
proposed in the literature (Singhal et al., 2013), 
(Bernstein et al., 2009), (Celesti et al., 2010). Recently, 
(Bohli et al., 2013) presented a four type classification 
of the security-enhancing architectural approaches 
for multi-cloud applications: replication of 
application tasks, partition of system into tiers, 
partition of logic into fragments, and partition of 
data into fragments. In this paper, only the last three 
types are considered i.e., those where the application 
is partitioned into components, be they application 
business logic or data, deployed in different clouds. 
This paper presents the methodology adopted in 
MUSA EU H2020 project for the selection of 
desired security controls over multi-cloud 
applications. The methodology is applicable to any 
of the partition-based multi-cloud approaches 
considered and enables the identification of the 
application components’ risks and the derivation of 
the appropriate security controls to apply to both 
application components and the cloud services 
exploited by such components. These security 
controls will be used to build the Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) that describes the Service Level 
Objective (SLO) clauses promised to the multi-cloud 
application customers. The SLA that includes 
 information of guaranteed security controls is the 
basis for the assessment of adequate performance of 
security behaviour during operation. 
The paper is structured as follows. Next Section 
3 introduces the main security challenges of multi-
cloud applications and Section 4 discusses existing 
approaches for threat modelling as the basis for the 
security control identification. The Section 5 
introduces the security control identification 
methodology itself, while Section 6 describes the 
methodology applicability and results of its adoption 
in a particular case study of MUSA project. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes the paper explaining future 
work.  
3 MULTI-CLOUD 
APPLICATIONS SECURITY 
The term Multi-Cloud denotes the usage of 
multiple, independent clouds by a client or a service, 
unlike Cloud Federations that are achieved when a 
set of cloud providers voluntarily interconnect their 
infrastructures to allow sharing of resources among 
each other (0, (Nikolay Grozev and Buyya, 2012 )). 
Even if, at state of art, few concrete multicloud 
solutions exists, the topic is considered extremely 
relevant: the need for multicloud solution is well 
demonstrated by the number of research projects that 
are proposing solutions and techniques to address 
the multicloud approach, like OPTIMIS, mOSAIC, 
MODAClouds, PaaSAge, Cloud4SOA ((Petcu et al. 
2011), (Ferrer et al. 2012)). It is out of the scope of this 
paper to offer a complete survey of such activities, it 
is suggested that the interested reader check the 
following papers: ((Nikolay Grozev and Buyya, 2012), 
(Baryannis et al., 2013) and (Zeginis et al., 2013)). 
Multicloud approaches are debatable, respect to 
security topic: some authors proposes multicloud 
approaches as a way to improve the level of security 
for customers, other authors suggests that 
distributing applications among multiple CSPs 
increase the number of security issues, obtaining as a 
result a lower level of security. 
 (Alzain et al., 2014) and (Bernstein and Vij, 2010) 
offers simple surveys of solutions that try to improve 
the security using multicloud techniques. In 
concrete, the main results are available for storage 
services, as an example (Yan et al., 2012) and (Oliveira 
et al., 2010) proposes techniques to distribute a file 
over multiple provider or untrusted network, 
granting higher confidentiality and the integrity of 
data. 
It is worth noticing that all the paper that sustain 
the higher security of the multicloud approach 
focuses on increase of one or more specific security 
property offered to the customers.  
0 and 0 face the security in multi-cloud 
application in a different perspective: they analyses 
different multicloud solutions and try to make a 
security assessment of the overall application 
behaviour, outlining the new security issues 
introduced by the multicloud approach.  
While the security assessment approach is very 
interesting, both papers deals with a very high-level 
description of the solution and does not offer a clear 
solution to make an assessment for a real multicloud 
application.  
At best of author’s knowledge there are no 
concrete techniques that try to address the issue of 
developing multicloud application trying to take in 
consideration user security requirements from the 
early development stages. 
4 THREAT MODELLING 
TECHNIQUES 
In order to address systematically security issues 
in multicloud application, it is proposed in this paper 
according to security best practices (Myagmar, 2005), 
to perform a security assessment from the very early 
development stages: multicloud application design 
will include the definition of a threat model, which 
is a structured representation of all the information 
that affects the security of an application. 
Thanks to the integrated threat model, it will be 
possible to perform a systematic risk analysis of the 
multicloud application identifying the security 
requirements requested to Cloud Service Providers 
(CSPs). 
At state of art, there are at least two general 
approaches to threat modelling: attack-based and 
software-based. 
Attack-based approaches build a threat model 
starting from the attacker point of view and aiming 
at identifying the possible attacks to the target 
software. Examples of such an approach are threat 
models based on attack tree (Shostack, 2008), (Saini et 
al., 2008). 
Software-based approaches focus on the 
architecture of the software to be secured an aims at 
classifying the possible risks in order to rank their 
importance and address them according to different 
priority levels (Oladimeji et al., 2006), (Sodiya et al., 
2007). 
It is out of the scope of this paper to propose a 
complete survey over threat modelling techniques, it 
is suggested that the interested reader check (Hussain 
et al., 2014) and (Tondel et al., 2008),   which 
 summarize the most common approaches and 
compare them. 
In this paper the multicloud application are 
mainly composed of web application (see further 
sections, so the approaches suggested by the 
OWASP project (OWASP, 2015) was adopted as it 
collects tools devoted to web security. The threat 
modelling technique adopted is STRIDE 
methodology, proposed by Microsoft and largely 
adopted in the context of web applications (Sodiya et 
al., 2007). 
According to such approach, threats are 
classified in 6 simple categories: Spoofing Identity, 
Tampering with Data, Repudiation, Information 
Disclosure, Denial of Service and Elevation of 
Privilege. 
In the following STRIDE methodology is 
adopted in order to identify the security 
requirements and the needed countermeasures 
(represented in terms of security controls) for each 
of the component of a multi-cloud application, with 
the goal of offering an approach that aims at making 
a complete security assessment of multi-cloud 
applications.  
5 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
 One core aspect of the proposed methodology is 
that the security controls address not only the threats 
identified during the risk assessment process, but 
also those business requirements that can be tackled 
by security controls. For example, in the realm of 
cloud computing, data location is a variable where 
the service consumer has little influence; 
nevertheless, applications storing personal data must 
have very clear control on the location where this 
data is stored. These types of requirements are 
identified in a business requirements capture phase 
and addressed by security controls, which otherwise 
would be skipped by traditional threat modelling 
techniques, which focus on security attacks. 
The proposed methodology is composed of five 
steps, namely application decomposition, threat 
identification and risk assessment, business 
requirements capture, cloud security requirements 
identification and selection of security controls. 
These five steps constitute a process of application 
security analysis which is very essential in the 
identification of threats, determination of mitigating 
measures and implementation of security controls in 
multi-cloud applications. It ensures that threats are 
identified and business requirements captured. These 
serve as a basis for determining the appropriate 
countermeasures and implementing security 
controls. The second and third steps (threat 
identification & risk assessment and business 
requirements capture) of the methodology may be 
performed in parallel and they are both inputs for 
step four (cloud security requirements 
identification). The final step, five (Selection of 
security controls), ensure that the security 
requirements are satisfied. The sequence of the 
proposed methodology is shown in Figure 1. Next 
these steps are described in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Proposed methodology for obtaining security 
controls 
5.1 Application Decomposition 
The first step of the methodology is application 
decomposition. It is a process of breaking down an 
application into the different components which 
make up the application. This activity provides an 
insight on the operation and relationship of the 
application with external entities. It is essential 
because it helps to identify potential threat targets. 
Basically, application decomposition consists of 
three stages, namely identification of assets, 
identification of entry points and identification of 
trust levels. Asset identification is the identification 
of application components that are prone to attack 
i.e., the components in which a potential attacker 
might be interested in. Identification of entry points 
involves identifying the interfaces through which 
connection may be made to the application i.e., the 
points of connection through which a potential 
attacker can access the application such as HTTP 
ports etc. The identification of trust levels involves 
identifying the different levels of access rights that 
would be granted to external entities by the 
application.  
 5.2 Threat Identification and Risk 
Assessment 
The second step of the methodology is threat 
identification and risk assessment. Threat 
identification is the determination of threats 
associated with each of the application components. 
This process will ensure that the likely threats which 
may impact the application based on the intention of 
a potential attacker are clearly identified. An 
evaluation of the risk associated with the identified 
threats is then estimated. Threat identification and 
risk assessment basically involves two stages, 
namely determination & ranking of threats and risk 
assessment. Determination and ranking of threats is 
a process of determining the threats associated with 
the application components using STRIDE as a 
threat categorization methodology, as outlined in the 
previous section. Risk assessment involves the 
evaluation of the potential risks associated with the 
identified threats. In risk assessment, the likelihood 
of the occurrence and the impact of the identified 
threats in each of the components are evaluated. This 
helps to determine the extent of damage in the 
application in the case of an attack. The risk 
associated with each of the identified threats can be 
estimated using a value-based risk model like 
DREAD (OWASP, 2015)  or quantitative risk model 
i.e., where Risk is computed as the product of 
likelihood and impact. (Risk = likelihood x impact). 
5.3 Business requirements capture  
 The third step of the methodology is business 
requirements capture. This is performed in order to 
identify the cloud compliance requirements for 
example for data governance. In multi-cloud 
applications, certain requirements have to be met in 
order to fulfil data governance particularly as it 
concerns storage, back-up, transfer and protection of 
data. These sets of requirements constitute the 
business requirements capture for the multi-cloud 
application. For example, as it relates to the location 
and storage of data, there are certain data 
governance law and regulation that a data controller 
(who determines the use of personal data) must 
comply with before processing personal data. 
Therefore, the business requirements capture must 
be made in order to identify these requirements and 
also to ensure that the cloud components of the 
multi-cloud application comply with the relevant 
data law requirements.  
 
 
 
5.4 Cloud security requirements 
Identification 
The fourth step of this methodology is cloud 
security requirements identification. Cloud security 
requirements refer to the security and privacy 
requirements for cloud services. These requirements 
are derived from cloud computing industrial 
standards and relevant data protection laws. It serves 
as a guide for assessing the level of security and 
identifying the security requirements needed to 
protect the cloud environment. Cloud security 
requirements further supplements the threats and 
business capture requirements identified in the 
previous steps. It helps to identify security 
requirements needed to mitigate identified risks in 
the second step of the methodology and also other 
security requirements needed to fulfil legal and 
business requirements.  
5.5 Selection of Controls 
The last step of the methodology deals with the 
identification of the countermeasures needed to 
respect the security requirements. 
Countermeasures are represented using standard 
security control Frameworks ((NIST, 2014), (CSA, 
2011)). Security controls are “a safeguard or 
countermeasure prescribed for an information 
system or an organization designed to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its 
information and to meet a set of defined security 
requirements” (NIST, 2014).  
Security Control Frameworks collects and 
organize security controls in order to offer 
guidelines to building secure systems in a standard 
way: thanks to the standard list of controls it is 
possible to assess the security of a system and 
compare it with requirements, verifying how many 
and in which way controls are concretely 
implemented. At state of art Controls are adopted by 
certification authorities and or third parties that by a 
(human–driven) audit verify compliance with 
security requirements and eventually regulations. 
In order to apply the proposed approach in the 
cloud environment and for specific services, instead 
that respect to the overall CSPs infrastructure, 
recently such controls are embedded into Security 
SLA in order to grant the level of security offered by 
each service ((Casola, 2015b),  (Luna et al., 2015)). 
In the proposed methodology, the security 
control of the NIST framework is classified with 
respect to category of threats, type of components 
and security requirement, in order to identify the set 
of controls needed for each component. 
The final result is a simple Security SLA that 
summarizes the needs, in terms of security control, 
 for each of the component of the multicloud 
application. Such information can be used by a 
broker in order to acquire resources respecting the 
security requirements requested (Casola, 2015a).  
6 APPLICATION OF THE 
METHODOLOGY IN A CASE 
STUDY 
The methodology explained in the foregoing 
section is applied in a case study in order to identify 
the threats and determine the appropriate security 
control measures. The case study is Tampere Smart 
Mobility (TSM). TSM is a smart mobility multi-
cloud application which enables and supports an 
energy efficient and smart mobility of citizens of 
Tampere, Finland. The TSM application provides 
users with customized journey recommendations 
from which they can make their choice. To achieve 
this, the TSM stores their personal data, such as 
name, age and mobility habits on the cloud. 
Therefore, adequate security controls must be 
integrated into the TSM application to protect the 
personal data of the users. The next section shows 
how the methodology is applied in this case study. 
6.1 Application Decomposition 
 
The TSM application is carefully analyzed in order 
to identify the assets, entry points and trust levels. 
On decomposing the TSM application, six assets i.e., 
the threats targets were identified, namely mobile 
app, database, TSM engine, Journey planner, 
Consumption estimator and the Identity 
manager/Access manager. All the assets apart from 
the mobile app would be deployed in a multi-cloud 
layout. The TSM application entry points are mobile 
user interface, HTTP, web server and HTTP port. 
The trust levels are: administrator (back-end 
application manager), end user (citizens) and TSM 
components (TSM assets).  
6.2 Threat Identification and Risk 
Assessment 
In the identification of threats in the TSM 
application, the STRIDE categorization 
methodology was used. The STRIDE methodology 
was applied to all the TSM application assets 
identified in the previous step (6.1). The likelihood 
and impact of each threat on each asset was 
estimated, thus resulting in the risk assessment of the 
TSM application. A quantitative approach was used 
to evaluate the risk associated with each asset i.e., on 
a scale of (0-10), numerical values were estimated 
for the likelihood and impact of each threat on each 
component. With these parameters the computer risk 
ranges from 0 (no risk) to 100 (high risk).  
The result of the threat identification and risk 
assessment step is provided in the Table 1. The ID 
notation goes as follow: DB.S represents Database 
spoofing threat; JP.T represents Journey planner 
tampering threat and so on. 
 
Table 1: TSM Application Threat identification and Risk assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6.3 Business requirements capture 
In identifying the cloud compliance requirements 
for data governance in the TSM application, the 
Finnish Personal Data Act (523/1999) was applied. 
This is because Tampere University of Technology 
(TUT) who is the data controller is established in 
Finland. The  Act  specifies the requirements and 
guidelines aimed at protecting the rights and privacy 
of users in the processing of their personal data. The 
business requirements identified through the 
application of the Finnish Data Act were duties of 
data controller and data owner, data storage location 
& transfer of data and data security.  
In summary, this act requires that the collected 
data must be store within the territory of the EU. In 
case it is transferred out of EU, the destination must 
be in within a list of authorized countries. The data 
controller must inform the users about the location 
of their data, so data awareness is required. The 
controller should also provide data privacy 
protection. 
6.4 Cloud security requirements 
Identification 
In order to identify the cloud security 
requirements for the TSM application, the SINTEF 
catalog was used. The SINTEF cloud security 
requirements catalog is a checklist with security and 
privacy requirements for public cloud services 
(Bernsmed et al., 2015). It is essentially meant for 
evaluating cloud security requirements. Based on the 
results of the risk assessment carried out in the threat 
identification and risk assessment step (6.2) and the 
business requirements capture step (6.3), a security 
requirement matrix was generated. See Table 2 in 
appendix. It specifies the relevant security 
requirements per component of the TSM application. 
The security requirements are listed as rows while 
the TSM application components are listed as 
columns. 
For a given multi-cloud component, a security 
requirement might or might not be needed. It is 
needed if it can mitigate the risk of a threat 
computed in the step two of the methodology or if it 
can address a business requirement, captured in the 
step three of the methodology. In case the 
requirement is not needed the cell value will be null, 
otherwise it will have a unique ID. For example, in 
Table 2 the security requirement Encryption is 
associated with the risk ID DB.S (Database 
Spoofing). This means, that Encryption is needed to 
mitigate the spoofing risk within the database 
component.  
6.5 Selection of Controls 
According to the Threat analysis performed and 
to the selection of security requirements, the 
identification of specific security controls needed, 
can now be addressed. 
As anticipated, the security controls are 
associated to threat classes and the type of 
components. 
According to the high level collection of security 
requirement shown before, a set of properties to be 
respected have been identified for each of the threat 
categories of the STRIDE methodology and for each 
of the component. Figure 2, available in appendix, 
illustrate an example of properties for the Tampering 
of Data category, associated to the TSM Engine 
component. 
In order to identify the security controls 
requested to our multi-cloud application, the 
properties identified above are listed, and the control 
family which addresses the security issue and the 
specific controls that must be implemented to grant 
the correct level of security is also identified. 
Table 3, in appendix, summarizes the list of controls 
that were selected for each of the properties 
proposed. 
It is worth noticing that, at the end of the full 
process, a full list of security requirements that 
affect the multicloud application architecture (as 
reported in Table 2) and a list of security controls 
that must be verified against the final application 
configuration and the technologies adopted to 
implement the multi-cloud application are derived 
(reported in Table 3). 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Application security assurance in multi-cloud 
environments is a challenging topic due to the lack 
of standards and widely adopted best practices. The 
proper selection of security controls over multi-
cloud application components and the cloud services 
they use is crucial for an adequate assessment of 
SLA fulfilment and regulatory compliance. As 
explained above, this selection depends on the risk 
profile wanted for the application and the multi-
cloud approach adopted. 
This paper introduces a methodology for the 
systematic identification of multi-cloud application 
threats and risks, as well as the derivation of security 
controls that can be used to monitor and manage 
desired security aspects of multi-cloud applications 
at runtime. The methodology is compatible with 
SLA-driven continuous security assurance and it 
 will be supported by the MUSA framework tools 
which first prototypes will be ready in July 2016. 
It is expected that in future publications, the 
security-aware SLAs created following the 
methodology explained herein will be presented, 
together with the MUSA methods and tools to 
generate them. One of the major challenges in that 
research is on the indicators and metrics applicable 
to each security control and their composability to 
derive actual values of the security controls. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 2: Multi-cloud security requirements matrix (Excerpt) 
 
 
DB JP TSMe CE IAM 
DataBase 
Journey 
Planner 
TSM 
engine 
Consumption 
Estimator 
Identity/ 
Access 
Manager Security Requirement 
Data Storage 
Requirements 
Back-up (S1) (S1) 
   
(S1) 
Encryption (S2) 
DB.S, DB.T, 
DB.I 
   
IAM.S, 
IAM.T, 
IAM.I 
Location (S3) (S3) 
   
(S3) 
Data 
Processing 
Requirements 
Isolation (P1) 
     
Monitoring (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) (P2) 
Location (P3) (P3) 
 
(P3) 
 
(P3) 
Forensics (IR4) 
      
 
Figure 2: Threat category, main countermeasures identification, classes of issues (Excerpt) 
 
 
  
Table 3: Threats, Requireents and Countermeasures (Excerpt) 
 
Property CONTROL GROUP NIST SP800-53 R3 
Data hashing 
Digital signature 
Encryption & Key Management 
Encryption 
  
SC-13 
SC-8 
Identity & Access Management 
Audit Tools Access 
AU-9 
Strong authorization Identity & Access Management 
User Access Authorization 
AC-3 
AC-6 
Identity & Access Management 
User Access Restriction / Authorization 
IA-5 (IA-5(1-12)) 
Message integrity 
protocols 
Encryption & Key Management 
Encryption 
SC-8 
SC-16 
Identity & Access Management 
Audit Tools Access 
AU-9 
  
 
